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In recent decades, German unions have rested on their institutional laurels even 
as the ground has slipped away.  This article analyzes two recent innovative campaigns 
based on grassroots mobilization that, the author argues, offer possibilities for renewed 
union strength.  A breakthrough campaign against a militantly anti-union firm in the 
retail industry demonstrates the potential for a German brand of social movement 
unionism.  The story line and institution-building strategy of this campaign fall entirely 
outside the framework of traditional German industrial relations.  A second, very dif-
ferent campaign, from deep inside that traditional framework, has mobilized union 
members in Nordrhein-Westfalen (IG Metall’s largest district) for active engagement 
in contract negotiations and membership growth.  Together, these two stories chal-
lenge existing perspectives on once stable German industrial relations, point toward 
inadequacies of prominent contemporary theories of institutional stability and change, 
and suggest constraints and opportunities for a German labor movement in need of 
strategic reorientation.
*The author is Professor of International & Compara-
tive Labor and Collective Bargaining, School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations, Cornell University.  For critical 
comments on earlier drafts of this article, he thanks 
Lee Adler, Martin Behrens, Michael Fichter, Ian Greer, 
Marco Hauptmeier, Chris Howell, Otto Jacobi, Jeffrey 
Raffo, Britta Rehder, Wolf-Jürgen Röder, Wolfgang 
Streeck, and Maite Tapia.  The Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 
provided generous funding to support the research on 
which this article is based.
 t the heart of the European labor move- 
 ment are the German unions, and 
especially the German Metalworkers Union 
(IG Metall), a powerful 2.3 million-member 
organization that, more than any other single 
union, sets benchmark standards for collec-
tive bargaining in Europe.  For more than a 
decade, however, German unions in a con-
text of global liberalization have confronted 
declines in membership, bargaining power, 
and political influence; most important, they 
have suffered a weakening of the labor institu-
tions—comprehensive collective bargaining 
and codetermination in a framework of social 
partnership—on which their power depends.
For too long, German unions have rested 
on their institutional laurels even as the 
ground has been slipping away.  Beyond the 
traditional institutional approaches, however, 
innovative campaigns based on grassroots 
mobilization offer possibilities for a renewal 
of union strength, in processes of both institu-
tion building and institutional revitalization. 
This article examines two such campaigns.
First, a breakthrough campaign in the 
retail branch of the service sector, against 
the militantly anti-union Schlecker drug 
store chain, demonstrates the potential for 
a German brand of social movement union-
ism.  The story line and institution-building 
strategy of this campaign fall entirely outside 
the framework of traditional industrial rela-
tions in the archetypal German “coordinated 
market economy.”
Second, a very different campaign, from 
deep inside the traditional framework of labor 
institutions, has mobilized union members 
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for active engagement in contract nego-
tiations and membership growth—another 
dramatic break with the traditions of German 
industrial relations.  In Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
IG Metall’s largest district, a new strategic 
orientation offers promise for institutional 
revitalization.
Together, these two stories challenge ex-
isting perspectives on once stable German 
industrial relations, and in so doing point 
toward inadequacies of prominent contem-
porary theories of institutional stability and 
change.  At the same time, they suggest both 
constraints and opportunities for a German 
labor movement in need of strategic reori-
entation.
The Argument:  Institutions and Activism
Apparently stable institutions, economic, 
political, and social, have been shaped in past 
processes of conflict and negotiation, and in 
the present are subject to continuing, often 
intense pressures that can result in incremen-
tal and eventually even transformative change 
(Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005b). 
Little by little, and sometimes more rapidly, 
institutions may lose their shaping influence 
even as actors carry on in established chan-
nels of interaction.  For unions and other 
actors committed to social regulation of a 
market economy, institutional erosion can be 
debilitating.  If institutions are not defended, 
reformed, or revitalized, the anchors that 
protect and advance the interests of social 
actors can drift away.
In a market economy, coordinated or liber-
al, labor institutions must arguably be shored 
up in periodic episodes or campaigns based 
on grassroots mobilization.1  This necessity, 
which on its face may seem onerous or even 
debilitating, is also a virtue—a resource for 
revitalization that employers cannot match. 
Such activist, as opposed to traditional, union 
strategies emerge when actors take advantage 
of opportunity located in social context and 
institutional openings.  Particular opportuni-
ties make activist strategies credible and allow 
those strategies to gain both leadership and 
grassroots support—typically as a product 
of internal organizational debate.  Unions, 
however, may or may not take advantage of 
opportunities.  In the end, organizations and 
individuals can and do make unpredictable 
decisions that matter.2
The argument is framed by a brief look 
at German labor’s postwar rise and decline, 
followed by contemporary case studies that 
demonstrate potential for renewal.  Espe-
cially important in this regard are the late 
1960s and early 1970s, a period when social 
movement turmoil threatened the stability 
of economic, social, and political institutions 
of all kinds, and a period that demonstrates 
in dramatic fashion the significance of social 
context for the revitalization of unions and 
labor institutions.
German Unions and the Social Movements 
of the Late 1960s and Early 1970s
After the horrors of the second World 
War, West Germany, with Allied support, for 
the first time in its history pulled together 
the ingredients for stable democracy.3  One 
central element was a new structure of unitary 
unions, sixteen non-competing industrial 
unions to divide up the private and public 
sectors of the economy, linked together in one 
common labor federation.  In negotiations 
with employer association counterparts, these 
unions would in time provide comprehen-
sive collective bargaining coverage to most 
West German workers.  Another ingredient, 
the works councils, appeared spontane-
ously in workplaces after the war, building 
on revolutionary and Weimar legacies, and 
were formally incorporated in legislation of 
1952 and 1972.  Together, comprehensive 
2To clarify, the dependent variable is the emergence of 
innovative, grassroots-based union strategies, as opposed to 
their relative success, a related but entirely different ques-
tion.  Indications of the latter are noted along the way, 
but the analysis presented here centers on emergence.
3This section is revised and updated from an earlier 
comparative analysis of unions and social movements 
in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany 
(Turner 2003:36–40).
1There are, of course, exceptions, as in Scandinavian 
countries, where labor institutions are unusually com-
prehensive and deeply entrenched.
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collective bargaining and codetermination, 
including significant labor representation on 
the supervisory boards of large companies, 
became the institutional pillars of strong 
unionism and stable industrial relations in the 
postwar period (Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 
1987:125–67).
While it may appear to some observers 
that postwar institution building in West 
Germany had little to do with democratic or 
grassroots mobilization, the opposite is true 
(Turner 2003:36–40).  Postwar codetermina-
tion built on the legacy of the works councils 
that were institutionalized in 1920 as part of 
a deal to suppress the 1918–19 revolutionary 
movement of workers and soldiers.  After the 
second World War, grassroots efforts by Ger-
man workers re-established the works councils 
that Hitler had abolished in 1933.  And a more 
strategic mobilization by German unions in 
the 1950s undercut employer efforts to turn 
works councils into “company unions.”
What prevented union decline in the face 
of challenges from a conservative government 
that came to power in 1982, at a time when 
unions in the United States and United King-
dom, at the dawn of the Thatcher/Reagan 
era, were already in full retreat?  German 
unions had been revitalized in three signifi-
cant ways.  The first was institutional.  After 
the disappointment of 1952 codetermination 
legislation that drew sharp lines between 
unions and works councils, unions mobilized 
at the grassroots to run slates of candidates 
in works council elections.  By the 1960s, in 
a process that would only deepen, unions 
had largely taken over the works councils, 
in effect turning these legally protected bod-
ies to their own purposes.  In so doing, the 
unions established two mutually reinforcing 
institutional structures for their bargaining 
agenda and influence:  comprehensive col-
lective bargaining at the industry level and 
codetermination at the firm level.
The second source of revitalization, espe-
cially important for the argument presented 
here, came with the social movements of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.  In one recounting:
Unrest spread at the shop-floor level, which finally 
exploded in a wave of spontaneous unofficial 
strikes in September 1969.  Dissatisfaction in 
the factories was fanned by the left-wing student 
movement that had proliferated in the wake of 
the Grand Coalition, but must also be seen as part 
of the worldwide upsurge in youth protest against 
the Vietnam War accompanied by a neo-Marxist 
critique of the international capitalist system. 
(Berghahn and Karsten 1987:210)  
Unlike the close relationship between stu-
dent and labor protest in France in 1968, the 
two movements remained quite separate in 
Germany.  Labor unrest took shape in wildcat 
strike waves of 1969, 1971, and 1973.  The 
result in the unions was shopfloor pressure on 
leaders to make more aggressive demands.  As 
Berghahn and Karsten (1987:211) put it, “The 
response of the union leaders to the incipient 
rank-and-file radicalism was a traditional one: 
they put themselves at the head of the move-
ment in an attempt to channel it.”  In other 
words, they rode a wave that forced them to 
incorporate rank-and-file demands, to bring 
aboard new shopfloor leaders including, in 
some cases, foreign workers, and to push for 
stronger union and works council rights in 
the workplace.4  And such rights were soon 
legislated, in 1972 and 1976 codetermination 
revisions, by a Social Democratic government 
elected in 1969 with labor’s support (Thelen 
1992).  The 1972 legislation amended the 
Works Constitution Act and was especially 
important for strengthening ties between 
works councils and unions.  1976 legislation 
increased the numbers of labor represen-
tatives on the supervisory boards of large 
German firms.
Social movement context was obviously a 
critical factor in the strengthening of labor 
institutions in the 1970s.  Necessary, per-
haps, but not enough:  other elements of 
opportunity were also important.  A divided 
federal government, the Grand Coalition of 
1966–69, followed by the election of the first 
postwar Social Democrat–led government, 
provided institutional openings for unions 
to use shopfloor militancy and political clout 
to escalate demands—demands that success-
fully reformed labor institutions.  And finally, 
unions engaged in internal debates in a con-
4A 1973 wildcat strike at the Ford plant in Cologne 
was viewed as a transformative event and still referred 
to by both works councilors and managers 20 years later 
as the “Turk strike” (author interviews).
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text in which credible strategic alternatives 
contended.  After first blocking grassroots 
pressure, some unions, including the pattern-
setting IG Metall, gave way to suppressed 
rank-and-file demands.  Those choices, given 
new opportunities located in social context 
and institutional openings, strengthened the 
hand of unions in their successful efforts at 
institution building.5
The West German labor movement found 
new vitality in the social movement context 
of the 1960s in yet another way.  As the social 
movements subsided in the 1970s, a cohort of 
young activists found union jobs in a variety 
of different positions and capacities.  By the 
1990s, a “long march through the institutions” 
had brought some of them to positions of 
power and influence.  Such leaders would, 
for example, play an important role in the 
Schlecker campaign described below.
The revitalization of German unions in 
the social movement context of the 1960s 
and 1970s stands in sharp contrast to the 
absence of revitalization in the same period 
in the United States.  For reasons including 
conservative leadership and cold war anti-
communism, labor leaders in the United 
States to a large extent blocked off unions 
from the social movements and their revi-
talization potential (Turner 2003:40–47). 
There were, to be sure, exceptions:  the 
Memphis sanitation workers strike in 1968, 
for example, in which civil rights and labor 
movements converged in a path-breaking 
victory;6 and the willingness of national 
SEIU president John Sweeney to hire social 
movement activists, launching the organiz-
ing momentum for what is now the largest 
union in North America.  For the most part, 
however, unions in the United States missed 
the historic opportunity for a renewal of 
strength, sorely needed in the face of an 
escalating employer offensive that would 
result in a rout by the 1980s.
The Crisis of the Contemporary  
German Labor Movement
For German unions, 35 years have passed 
since the last period of social movement 
revitalization.  Are successful strategies of 
recent decades sufficient in an era of global 
liberalization and neoliberal governance, 
when employers and the state are increas-
ingly determined to push back union influ-
ence?  Are strong institutions and top-down 
strategies enough to ward off decline?  Is the 
traditional emphasis on wage policy enough? 
The answers have to be negative (compare 
Menz 2005; Schnabel 2005; Streeck 2005; 
IG Metall 2008).  Union membership den-
sity and collective bargaining coverage have 
declined steadily since the mid-1990s (Visser 
2006; Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner 2006; 
Bispinck 2008).7  Employer associations, the 
union bargaining partners for comprehensive 
collective bargaining, have also been losing 
membership density and the coherence of a 
unified strategy (Schröder and Silvia 2006:9; 
Thelen and Kume 2006).  Unions remain 
influential in German society thanks to an 
entrenched institutional position, especially 
in the manufacturing industries of the world’s 
leading export nation.  Yet IG Metall was 
weakened in 2003 in a failed strike effort, 
a defeat that can be understood partly as a 
result of union leaders’ reliance on traditional 
institutions and strategies.8  German unions 
5Wolfgang Streeck (2005:141–42) makes the argu-
ment that unions used their increased power in the 
1960s and 1970s to advance the interests of their own 
members rather than the broader work force and soci-
ety.  In this and subsequent bargaining rounds German 
unions thus placed added burdens on the welfare state, 
contributing in the long run to failed economic and 
social policy (resulting in part from “private use of the 
public interest”).  If this is true, unions can hardly be 
faulted for responding to the demands of their members 
to use increased bargaining power to raise wages, as for 
reasons of internal politics they must do.  Like the rest of 
us, unions have no crystal ball; and they also used their 
political power to expand the universal benefits of the 
welfare state, funded to a large extent through higher 
payroll tax receipts made possible by higher wages.
6See, for example, the extraordinary documentary 
film “At the River I Stand,” Newsreel 1993.
7Overall union membership density dropped from 
29.2% in 1995 to 22.65% in 2003 (Visser 2006:45).  From 
1998 to 2006, collective bargaining coverage dropped 
from 76% to 65% in western Germany and from 63% to 
54% in the east.  For Germany as a whole, 63% of the work 
force was covered by collective bargaining agreements 
in 2006:  54% of these in industry sector contracts and 
9% in firm-level contracts (Bispinck 2008:7).
8In 2003, in a collective bargaining campaign demand-
ing a shorter work week in eastern Germany, to match 
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from 2003 to 2008 played a popular but 
largely reactive role in defending the welfare 
state.  And over time, declining membership 
can only mean declining influence even as 
unions retain a (weakened) insider role in 
the institutions of social partnership (Fichter 
2003; Greer 2006, 2007).
German unions for the most part have 
not developed successful strategies to re-
cruit new members, from young workers in 
manufacturing to women in retail services 
and call centers to young professionals in 
information technology industries (Schnabel 
2005).  They have recognized the problem, 
discussed it widely, held conferences, and 
unproductively complained at length about 
individualistic young workers and passive 
easterners.  For the most part, however, they 
have not moved beyond existing approaches: 
exhorting over-extended works councilors to 
sign up members and exploiting situations 
of collective bargaining conflict and political 
protest to bring in new members.  Time-tested 
traditional strategies come up short in the 
face of current challenges.
Indications that the German labor move-
ment is in crisis are abundant and obvious. 
They include declining membership den-
sity and bargaining coverage; inability to 
consolidate and expand union presence in 
circumstances of continuing economic cri-
sis in the eastern part of unified Germany; 
failure to organize expanding sectors of the 
economy such as private services, including 
low-wage occupations such as retail clerks, 
security guards, call center employees, and 
janitors; the high-profile collapse of worker 
and public support for a 2003 strike in 
eastern Germany led by the pattern-setting 
German Metalworkers Union; welfare state 
cutbacks in areas such as health coverage, 
unemployment insurance, and retirement, 
actively but ineffectively opposed by unions 
whose efforts, in spite of alternative proposals, 
have appeared largely reactive;9 a protracted 
public sector strike in 2006, in which central-
ized bargaining structures collapsed and 
ver.di (the consolidated service and public 
sector workers’ union) was forced to make 
unpopular working time concessions; and 
the absence (with important exceptions) of 
effective strategies to address European and 
global economic integration.
Union leaders are aware of and could 
perhaps take some lessons from current orga-
nizing and campaigning strategies, especially 
the emphasis on grassroots mobilization, in 
the American and British labor movements—
adapted to their own circumstances (Raffo 
2007; Schreider 2007a; IG Metall 2008).  Ger-
man unions have far greater resources at their 
disposal should they move in such a direc-
tion.  They have institutional protections that 
could provide a strong platform for strategic 
innovation, in cases where this might make 
sense.  Those same institutions, however, in 
providing the security of established channels 
of representation, also provide disincentives 
for innovation (see also Hassel 2007).
There are good reasons to resist a grass-
roots-oriented shift in strategy:  the expense 
is great and funds must be reallocated from 
somewhere else (and in the German case, 
that “somewhere else” may itself be well 
positioned institutionally); union leaders set 
in their ways must be persuaded or pushed 
out; an influx of new members with fresh 
demands can destabilize an organization 
and challenge existing leadership.  It may 
be that German unions, with still substan-
tial institutional anchors, are simply not 
desperate enough to move toward the risky 
innovations of a more activist model—even 
if such strategic reforms are necessary to 
reverse decline (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege 
2003; Annesley 2006).  That some German 
unions are experimenting with new strategies 
indicates that innovation is possible in the 
contemporary context.  Will it take broader 
social movement pressure, from inside as well 
as outside the labor movement, to accelerate 
the process and provide the force necessary 
for appropriate institutional reform?  Must 
German unions wait for the unpredictable 
Godot of a new social movement wave?
German unions owe their strength, in 
part, to the effect of past social movements in 
building and revitalizing institutions.  As a re-
standards in the west, IG Metall suffered its first major 
strike defeat in 50 years (see below).
9“Ineffectively” should be qualified by the widely 
held view that vast union-led demonstrations may well 
have set limits on further reform.
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sult, unions remain institutionally anchored 
within the German political economy—so 
well anchored, in fact, that the urgent need 
for new strategies may go unmet.  The two 
stories that follow illustrate exceptions, in-
novations that may offer German unions a 
way out.  The first case demonstrates strate-
gic organizing potential in low-wage private 
services.  The second case shows the poten-
tial for the revitalization of worker interest 
representation in high-wage manufacturing. 
The cases involve, respectively, ver.di and IG 
Metall, the two large unions that dominate 
the German labor landscape.
Institution Building in the German Retail 
Sector:  The Schlecker and Lidl Campaigns
Several years before the 2001 merger 
that created ver.di, Germany’s consolidated 
service workers union, a remarkable cam-
paign led by HBV (banking, insurance, and 
retail union) offered an alternative model 
for contemporary union strategy, bringing 
social movement activism to a German labor 
campaign.10  The effort was led by a small 
group of union and rank-and-file activists 
employing a range of tactics that together 
amount to what in the United States would 
be called a comprehensive campaign.
The story begins early in 1994 when HBV 
officials in the Mannheim office were ap-
proached by several employees of Schlecker, 
a nationwide chain of small drug stores, a 
company with a well-deserved reputation for 
opposition to any works councils or union 
presence.11  Pay records and working condi-
tions showed both undercutting of existing 
contracts and violations of law.  Union ef-
forts on behalf of the employees met with 
no response from the company.  When the 
death of an employee exposed unsafe work-
ing conditions (in this case, no telephone to 
call for help in a life-threatening emergency), 
labor practices at Schlecker received national 
attention.  In the ensuing eight months, the 
union developed a broad campaign that 
would bring company abuses to the public 
eye, embolden employees, and force major 
concessions on their behalf.
Details are many, but the essence of the 
story is this.  Schlecker is a nationwide Ger-
man company consisting of mini-stores, often 
with no more than five employees.  As of 
1993, the rapidly growing company’s 22,500 
employees were spread across the country in 
4,250 stores (Huhn 2001:24).  The workers 
were and are mostly women, many working 
part-time, isolated from employees in other 
stores.  Schlecker made its profits in part by 
paying the lowest possible wages and provid-
ing minimal working conditions.  Company 
practice as of 1994 was to discourage any 
employee effort to exercise legally mandated 
codetermination rights, with works councils 
present in only a very small number of stores. 
As the HBV campaign developed, attention 
centered on fighting company abuses in pay 
and working conditions as well as establishing 
elected works councils to enforce agreements 
and negotiate improvements.
In response to aggressive company oppo-
sition, including intimidation of employees 
and the firing of activists, HBV leaders in 
Mannheim and Heidelberg, led by local 
union president Anton Kobel, developed 
step-by-step a campaign both broad and 
sophisticated.  In contrast to established 
German labor practices based on relations of 
social partnership punctuated by occasional 
collective bargaining conflict, this campaign 
built on an explicit logic of social movement 
unionism.12  Key tactics included active em-
10Ver.di was formed in 2001 by a merger of five unions: 
ÖTV (public sector, largest of the five merged unions), 
DPG (postal and telecommunications), HBV (banking, 
insurance, and retail), IG Medien (media, printing) 
and DAG (white-collar).  Since then, the merged union 
has alternated with IG Metall as the largest German 
union.  In 2007, IG Metall membership was 2.31 million 
compared to ver.di’s 2.21 million (as reported by EIRO 
online, April 22, 2008—http://www.eurofound.europa.
eu/eiro/2008/03/articles/de0803019i.htm).
11The Schlecker story told here is based on interviews 
with a number of participants and observers, including 
Anton Kobel and Uli Wohland, who played leading roles 
in the campaign; conversations with labor researchers 
and academic observers; and news reports, documents, 
and publications such as Huhn (2001); Bremme, Fürniss, 
and Meinecke (2007); Bormann (2008).
12Unlike the broader social movements that rise and 
fall in unpredictable historical waves, “social movement 
unionism” refers to a strategic orientation that privileges 
activist efforts such as grassroots mobilization and social 
coalition building.
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ployee engagement, press conferences, legal 
proceedings, political pressure, and social 
networks that built support from a variety of 
social actors.  Extensive publicity included the 
“shaming” of Anton and Christa Schlecker 
in the courts and in the public realm.  The 
death of an employee helped expose company 
practices that drew Schlecker customers into 
an extensive letter-writing campaign and a 
de facto boycott that cut sales by up to 40% 
in some areas.  Priests, ministers, politicians, 
and community leaders declared themselves 
“godparents,” protectors of employees active 
in the campaign.
Given the significance of codetermina-
tion in the German dual system of industrial 
relations, union efforts to support the estab-
lishment of works councils were especially 
important.  As do American companies in 
union organizing drives, Schlecker fought 
the union’s efforts not only through threats 
to employees who stepped forward as works 
council candidates but also in jurisdictional 
battles.  Given the small size of each store, 
the union demanded that the company sign 
a contract that would enable employees to set 
up regional works councils covering a number 
of stores, with enough employees to make 
representation meaningful.  The company in-
sisted on works councils for individual stores, 
effectively stripping each small employee 
group of any real power in relation to man-
agement.  As part of the broader campaign, 
the union unilaterally established regional 
works councils, made up of employees in 
several areas of Germany willing to run for 
election and serve as works councilors even 
in the face of continuing company refusal 
to recognize the new representative bodies.
The campaign intensified through the fall 
of 1994 and winter of 1995.  Facing severe 
losses of its customer base and reputation, 
Schlecker’s aggressive opposition gradually 
gave way to concessions regarding working 
conditions and the enforcement of pay 
standards.  Surrounded on all sides by legal, 
political, community, union, and employee 
opposition, the company finally backed 
down.  In March 1995, the HBV national 
office in Düsseldorf signed an agreement 
with Schlecker that included recognition of 
works councils established at Schlecker on 
a regional basis, adherence to collective bar-
gaining contract provisions with verification 
by the Labor Ministry, and the withdrawal of 
legal action against activist employees.  In 
1995 and the years following, works councils 
were established in regions across Germany, 
not everywhere but in enough areas with 
enough employee participation to become 
meaningful workplace bargaining partners.  A 
general works council drawn from the regions 
negotiated company-wide agreements with 
top management.  In 2000, the union and 
company signed a multiyear contract (“An-
nerkennungsvertrag”), above and beyond the 
sector-wide collective bargaining contract, 
that provided for regularized company rec-
ognition of works councils.
The picture is not all rosy.  In subsequent 
years, Schlecker management renewed 
aggressive efforts aimed at hindering the 
establishment of new works councils.  To 
weaken existing works councils, the company 
pressured employees and played works coun-
cilors off against each other, encouraging 
conflict between pro-company and pro-union 
advocates in the work force (Bormann 2008).
Nonetheless, independent worker interest 
representation remained firmly established 
throughout the company.  By 2005, about 
a third of Schlecker stores in Germany had 
works council representation (see von �g-
lincki 2005:9).  As of 2007, about 100 works 
councils represented employees throughout 
the company, and the general works council 
had proven itself a strong bargaining partner 
for management (Bormann 2008).  While 
dramatic breakthroughs lay in the past, 
efforts to build more works councils and 
recruit union members persisted in the face 
of company opposition.
What explains the emergence of innovative 
union strategy at Schlecker?  While causation 
cannot be established on the basis of one case 
study, the evidence points toward opportunity 
structure (in social context and institutional 
openings) and actor choice.  The social context 
included two critical elements:  the growing 
entry of women into the German work force, 
especially in low-paid service sector jobs such 
as retail sales; and the presence of numer-
ous social groups, some with backgrounds in 
environmental, peace, women’s, and other 
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movements, ready to take up the increas-
ingly salient issue of economic injustice. 
Institutional openings included two contrast-
ing elements.  First, the space for innovation 
was wide open:  no existing structures of 
representation at Schlecker blocked the way, 
nor did entrenched union leadership or set 
strategy (in a sector that unions had largely 
ignored).  Second, German labor institu-
tions—comprehensive collective bargaining, 
codetermination, education and training 
rights for works councilors—provided a vi-
able basis on which to build, once the union 
decided to do this.
Finally, HBV leadership in Mannheim 
made the choice in 1994 to throw its energies 
into a major campaign at Schlecker, in a 
comprehensive effort based on the lessons of 
past social movements.  Key “Mannheimers” 
had backgrounds in the social movements of 
the 1960s and subsequent social justice cam-
paigns of various types.  They had the requisite 
inclination and experience and were ready 
for the opportunity that presented itself.
When HBV merged into ver.di in 2001, 
the new national president Frank Bsirske 
praised HBV in Mannheim and the Schlecker 
campaign as a model for future union work 
in the service sector.13  In 2004, building on 
the Schlecker experience, ver.di launched a 
similar campaign at a larger target, Lidl, a 
chain of supermarkets with 40,000 employees 
in 2,600 German stores (Schreider 2007b).14 
The immediate goal at Lidl was the same as 
at Schlecker:  to set up works councils in the 
face of aggressive opposition from an anti-
union company.  In response to the concerns 
of employees who approached ver.di for help, 
union research exposed Lidl abuses, includ-
ing low pay, violations of law, pressure on 
employees not to engage in union activities 
(including the firing of outspoken campaign 
supporters), and shifting ownership patterns 
that undermined employee efforts to set up 
works councils.  Lidl ranked as the fourth larg-
est retail firm in Germany and was spreading 
rapidly across Europe in a web of trusts and 
cross-holdings.  The size and range of the 
company and its parent group allowed for 
an extensive anti-union repertoire of tactics 
and at the same time raised the stakes for 
union organizing.
The union’s comprehensive campaign in-
cluded the development of a core of activists 
in the company work force as well as social 
networks of support.  The union brought Lidl 
abuses into the public sphere with press con-
ferences and the publication of Schwarzbuch 
Lidl in late 2004 (Hamann and Giese 2004), 
and by 2005 the campaign was in full swing. 
As at Schlecker, the union framed the issue 
in terms of social justice and won backing 
from religious, human rights, global justice, 
and women’s groups as well as prominent 
individuals from politics and society.  Ver.
di activists developed the Lidl campaign 
explicitly based on the lessons of the earlier 
Schlecker experience; explanations for the 
emergence of the new campaign are similar 
in substance and can be located in social 
context, untapped institutional possibility in 
a wasteland of representation, and strategic 
choice (itself a product of organizational 
debate inside ver.di).
The union committed to a three-year cam-
paign.  At the end of the third year (2007–8), 
however, the company continued to resist 
the establishment of works councils.  Several 
hundred employees had joined the union, 
many more had gained new awareness of 
company policies and organizing possibilities, 
and a foundation now existed for potential 
future mobilization.  Although the campaign 
still lacked a breakthrough similar to labor’s 
accomplishments in the Schlecker case, 
significant victories in Stuttgart-Feuerbach 
and Hamburg in late 2007 and Rennigen 
bei Stuttgart in 2008 reflected local union 
mobilization, and brought to seven the total 
13See, for example, an interview with Frank Bsirske 
called “veni, vidi-ver.di,” Hamburger Abendblatt, March 
10, 2001, p. 2.
14Data supplied by ver.di, December 2005.  Infor-
mation on the Lidl campaign comes from a variety of 
sources, including interviews with campaign leader 
Agnes Schreider and other ver.di officials; documents 
and web sites such as htpp://lidl.verdi.de, htpp://lidl.
verdi.de/lidl/international, and http://lidl.verdi.de/
international/english; news reports such as Dougherty 
(2006); the ver.di publication Schwarzbuch Lidl (named 
for company owner Daniel Schwarz; Hamann and Giese 
2004), translated and published in English as the Black 
Book on Lidl in Europe in 2006.  See also ver.di (2007); 
Röhlk (2008).
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number of Lidl stores with works council 
representation (Röhlk 2008).15
Thus even as ver.di took major hits in the 
nationwide public sector strike in 2006, the 
union made only limited progress in expand-
ing segments of retail sales.  While the focus 
here is on identifying and explaining the 
emergence of innovative strategy rather than 
its relative success, the evidence also points to 
two factors that help explain limited progress 
at Lidl and at Schlecker after the initial vic-
tory:  intensive counter-mobilization by the 
target company, especially at Lidl, and a weak 
national union commitment of resources and 
staff.  Since unions have no control over the 
first of these variables, at least initially, the 
second is especially important.  The successful 
Schlecker campaign was grounded in grass-
roots mobilization initiated by a local union 
and later supported at national headquarters, 
aimed at a relatively unsuspecting target.  In 
the face of strategic counter-mobilization 
at Lidl, the union required a much greater 
commitment of resources and support.  Al-
though some local unions participated en-
thusiastically, staff could typically direct effort 
at the Lidl campaign only as one of several 
assignments.  And the same was true at the 
national level, where resource commitment 
for such intensive campaigns is especially 
important.  Even as ver.di designated the Lidl 
campaign a high-profile priority, only a small 
number of union staff were assigned to the 
campaign, and none of them were assigned 
on a full-time basis.16
In part, absence of support for the strategic 
innovations of a social movement unionism 
reflects continuing internal turmoil and 
staff cutbacks in a vast union, under siege on 
many fronts and still grappling with issues of 
focus and resource allocation in the wake of 
the problematic merger of five very differ-
ent unions in 2001 (Pieper 2007:26).  The 
Schlecker victory stands out as an exception 
in an overall picture of minimal strategic 
innovation and campaign success in rapidly 
growing retail sales occupations in which 
worker representation is weak or altogether 
absent (Jacobi 2003; Dribbusch 2005).  Key 
elements of an opportunity structure are 
present.  Expanded union commitment of 
resources and mobilization is arguably the 
missing ingredient.  The Schlecker cam-
paign offers a demonstration of innovative, 
potentially successful strategy, there for the 
taking yet largely neglected by national union 
leadership.  In spite of considerable interest 
in grassroots-based strategies, ver.di’s pri-
mary efforts continued to follow traditional 
channels that to a significant extent are no 
longer adequate to contemporary challenges 
(Annesley 2006; Bormann 2008).
Institutional Revitalization at IG Metall:  
Member Mobilization, 2004–2008
After prolonged membership decline and 
a major strike defeat in 2003, the German 
Metalworkers Union began in 2004 to move 
actively toward a new strategy of member en-
gagement, a significant departure from past 
practice.  Unlike the Schlecker campaign, 
the new approach did not include coalition 
building outside the union.  Member mobi-
lization, however, indicated a significant shift 
toward a more grassroots-based unionism, 
directed in part at revitalizing a weakened 
yet still substantial institutional base.
The central union demand in the failed 
collective bargaining campaign and strike 
of 2003 aimed at bringing work hours in 
eastern Germany down to the 35 hours-
per-week standard in western metalworking 
contracts.  A full analysis of the defeat is 
beyond the scope of the present analysis, but 
clearly an aggressive employer strategy that 
moved beyond traditional social partnership 
15While only seven out of 2,600 Lidl stores in Ger-
many had works councils as of spring 2008, successes in 
Stuttgart and Hamburg, in the face of strong company 
opposition, demonstrated the potential of grassroots 
mobilization, led in these cases by determined local 
activists.
16Information supplied by ver.di officials and external 
campaign supporters.  As a point of comparison, the 
United Food and Commercial Workers in the United 
States committed sixty full-time organizers to a supermarket 
organizing campaign that began in 2007 in Arizona (au-
thor interviews in Tempe, March 2008).  At 1.4 million 
members, the UFCW is considerably smaller than ver.
di.  Parallel commitments of staff have been made in 
the United States by SEIU in Justice for Janitors cam-
paigns and by UNITE HERE in Hotel Workers Rising. 
To re-emphasize the dimensions of this difference, ver.
di’s national office as of early 2008 had committed not 
a single full-time organizer to the Lidl campaign.
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relations drove the outcome (Raess 2006). 
Strategic failure, however, must also be laid 
at the doorstep of union leadership.17  The 
outcome of the strike included not only a 
retreat from highly publicized bargaining 
demands but also a collapse of member 
support for the strike in both east and west. 
The union‘s failure to develop a coherent, 
winning strategy appeared linked to an on-
going leadership battle following the retire-
ment of IG Metall president Klaus �wickel, 
a struggle that intensified after the defeat. 
Jürgen Peters, architect of the failed strike 
strategy, won a narrow election victory, but 
only with an agreement on succession for his 
reform-oriented opponent Berthold Huber. 
Arguably more significant for the future of 
the union, however, was the emergence of 
new leadership and strategic orientation in 
a critical IG Metall stronghold.18
The story begins in a small city called Sie-
gen, on the outskirts of Nordrhein-Westfalen 
in the industrial heartland of Germany.  Be-
tween 1993 and 1999, the local union had lost 
4,000 members.  Beginning in 1999, under the 
leadership of Detlef Wetzel, the local began in-
tensive discussion with works councilors and 
experimented with approaches that in time 
added up to a new strategy to rebuild union 
membership and renew union influence at 
the firm level.  With an emphasis on member 
engagement in firm-level bargaining and the 
active recruitment of new union members, 
the strategy yielded positive results.  By 2003, 
Siegen became one of a small number of IG 
Metall local unions in Germany to round the 
corner from declining membership levels to 
stabilization and the beginnings of growth.19
In large measure as a product of this lo-
cal success, Wetzel was elected head of the 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) district, with 
600,000 members the largest in IG Metall, in 
July 2004.20  Among other things, the union 
faced two interrelated problems:  employer 
undercutting of the established collective bar-
gaining contract, and membership decline. 
The new strategy centered on the participa-
tion of union members in workplace and 
company-level negotiations.  In a context of 
employer demands for further flexibility and 
increased work hours, two member demands 
came to the fore:  maintaining job security 
and enhancing training rights.  Member 
participation was driven in part by an expan-
sion of company-level negotiations that far 
exceeded the capabilities of union staff.
The logic unfolded as follows.  When firms 
sought to undercut the contract in response 
to competitive pressures, real or alleged, 
union members joined works councilors and 
IG Metall representatives in company-level 
negotiations.21  Enhanced opportunities for 
firm-specific bargaining were mandated in 
a three-year agreement between IG Metall 
and Gesamtmetall signed at Pforzheim in 
2004.22  When companies left the employer 
association or sought modifications of the 
industry contract, elected work force com-
mittees would insist on training rights and 
employment security in return for short-term 
concessions on pay and work hours.  Bring-
ing in shopfloor leaders made bargaining 
transparent and credible to members, thereby 
easing works council legitimacy problems that 
result from “co-management” in a period of 
concession bargaining (Rehder 2006).  Fre-
quently intense negotiations served as a basis 
17See Fichter (2003) for a concise analysis of the strike 
defeat and its consequences.  See also Raess (2006).
18The story presented below is based on a variety of 
sources, including interviews with IG Metall officials 
in Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Wuppertal, Cologne, and 
Frankfurt; conversations with academic observers; IG 
Metall, WSI, DGB, and EIRO web sites; and news articles 
such as Roth (2006), Hildebrand (2006), and Badekow 
(2007).  See also Viering (2007) and IG Metall (2008).
19Data supplied by IG Metall, Nordrhein-Westfalen 
district office.
20IG Metall district chiefs are elected not by union 
members but by the national executive board.
21As members of the metal industry employer as-
sociation, Gesamtmetall, most large employers and 
their employees in metal and electronic industries are 
covered by region-wide contracts (patterned nationally). 
Firms in need can use “opening clauses” to negotiate 
concessions with their own works councils, or they can 
leave the employer association or join a new association 
category that does not require adherence to the sector 
agreement (Schröder and Silvia 2006).
22For a summary of the agreement, see  http://www.
eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/03/feature/de0403203f.html. 
The IG Metall web page for the 2004 Pforzheim (Baden-
Württemberg) agreement is http://www.bw.igm.de/
news/meldung.html?id=645.
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for the recruitment of new members.  Gains 
in training rights and employment security 
made other concessions more palatable. 
The mobilization of participation added a 
new element to discretionary company-level 
negotiation options.
NRW leadership summed up its strategy 
as a “member-centered offensive,” with three 
key elements (Wetzel 2007):  Tarif Aktiv (ac-
tive bargaining)—aggressive negotiations at 
the firm level, with active member participa-
tion, to keep firms within the framework of 
sector collective bargaining contracts, or at 
the very least to negotiate acceptable com-
pany agreements; besser statt billiger (better 
not cheaper)—a proactive commitment to 
working with firms to raise product quality 
and productivity, drawing on present and 
future work force knowledge and skills, and 
in some cases bringing in outside experts in 
production reorganization; and membership 
growth—the mobilization of works councilors, 
union stewards, and members to recruit new 
members, with membership growth as the 
litmus test for the overall success of strategic 
reorientation.
Wetzel and colleagues argued that worker 
participation, aggressive negotiations, job 
preservation, and new training opportuni-
ties would strengthen membership loyalty 
to the union.  At the same time, the union 
trained works councilors and members to 
build on conflict, negotiations, and accept-
able outcomes to recruit new members.  A 
subjective yet significant aspect of strategic 
reorientation included what Americans 
might call a “can-do” attitude.  After years of 
uphill struggle against membership decline 
and company-level concession bargaining, 
IG Metall leaders and works councilors had 
in many cases become defensive and even 
defeatist, falling into a rhetoric of blame 
aimed at employers, outsourcing, globaliza-
tion, government policy, individualistic young 
workers, apathetic members, and free-riding 
non-union workers.  Wetzel insisted on a posi-
tive approach from union representatives at 
all levels.  The task at hand was not to gripe 
and complain but to lead and inspire.  The 
role of union leaders at regional and local 
levels, including works councilors elected 
on union slates, was to bring members into 
campaigns and negotiations, to win their 
support and build union membership and 
participation.  Together, the regional office 
and local branches set member recruitment 
targets and monitored progress on a regular 
basis.
Member and works council engagement 
served another purpose.  Because the union 
did not have the manpower to negotiate 
simultaneously on behalf of work forces 
at dozens of firms, works councilors, not 
to mention workers, often felt neglected 
by overtaxed local, regional, and national 
union leadership.  In a context of economic 
globalization, employer threats to outsource 
or relocate production undermined bargain-
ing power and forced works councilors to ac-
cept concessions (Raess and Burgoon 2006). 
Training works councilors and members to 
fight their own battles raised morale, made 
settlements acceptable even when conces-
sions proved unavoidable, and expanded the 
capacity of works councils and local union 
offices (Viering 2007).  And the agreements, 
where companies proved willing, aimed to 
strengthen labor-management collaboration 
on new bases that offered promise for the 
prospects of struggling firms (“besser statt 
billiger”).  The elements of the new approach 
added up to a proactive union strategy to 
regain the initiative, close off the low road 
tempting German employers, and push Ger-
man industry along its high-road trajectory.23
By mid-2005, NRW innovations had at-
tracted attention throughout IG Metall. 
Other regions and local offices had also be-
gun to experiment with similar approaches. 
Reflecting the growing influence of the new 
23On the growing competitiveness of German high-
end products in world markets, making Germany the 
world leader in exports by 2005 (ahead of the United 
States, Japan, and China), see, for example, Benoit and 
Milne (2006) and Landler (2007).  Export strength and 
renewed economic growth provided a supportive con-
text for the development of proactive union strategies 
of recruitment and engagement.  On the other hand, 
employers expanded employment by hiring contingent 
workers (temporary, part-time, and agency-provided) 
and sub-contracting work, thus limiting the positive ef-
fects of economic growth for union member recruiting 
efforts and arguably increasing the need for strategic 
innovation such as grassroots mobilization.
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member-centered approach, Detlef Wetzel 
was elected national vice-president of IG 
Metall at the union’s congress in Leipzig in 
November 2007.  In May 2008, an internal 
document charted the national union’s shift 
to a member-centered organizing strategy 
(IG Metall 2008).  Ironically, the paper em-
phasized learning from American unions, 
using English language terminology to call 
for a shift from traditional top-down, service-
oriented “business unionism” to a “social 
movement unionism” based on member 
mobilization.24  Beyond basic concepts, the 
new strategic orientation was reflected in spe-
cific campaign tactics, targets, and goals—to 
organize, for example, the growing numbers 
of temporary workers in metal and electron-
ics industries (Niemann-Findeisen 2008).
What accounts for the emergence of new 
strategy rooted in rank-and-file mobiliza-
tion?  The most obvious explanation lies with 
the rise of new leadership advocating and 
implementing innovative approaches.  Stra-
tegic reorientation, however, did not occur 
out of the blue.  Factors such as prolonged 
membership decline and social policy cut-
backs called traditional union strategies into 
question.  At the same time, institutional and 
social configurations offered opportunities 
for innovation.
Several interrelated developments had 
weakened IG Metall’s institutional posi-
tion and in so doing opened the door for 
reformist approaches and new leadership. 
Economic restructuring included the threat 
and in many cases the reality of business 
relocation and outsourcing of production. 
Collective bargaining coverage declined as 
firms defected from employer associations 
or joined a special membership category 
that allowed exemption from contract provi-
sions.  While the union made modest gains 
in sector contracts after 2004, the Pforzheim 
agreement also opened the door to countless 
new company-level negotiations.
On the other hand, Germany’s legislated 
labor institutions—codetermination, com-
prehensive collective bargaining, vocational 
training, labor courts—continued to provide 
a foundation on which to promote innovative 
strategies.  Divisions among employers in 
their strategies toward unions, moving more 
or less away from established relations of so-
cial partnership, also provided institutional 
openings.  Institutions thus provided oppor-
tunity both in openings for innovation and 
established anchors on which to build.  This 
opportunity structure stands in sharp contrast 
to the situation in the United States, where 
unions have exploited openings for strategic 
innovation but in the more difficult context, 
in many cases, of an institutional wasteland 
(Turner 2007b).  Grassroots mobilization 
developed in the German metalworking in-
dustry essentially as a strategy for the renewal 
of insider influence.25
Where labor institutions retain substantial 
strength, social context may not matter as 
much.  Still, high unemployment and job 
insecurity made workers and their represen-
tatives increasingly open to new ideas, from 
both left and right.  A sense of crisis fueled 
feelings of helplessness, fear of status loss, 
and rejection of an established order that 
included unions.  Extreme right-wing ideas 
appeared increasingly attractive to some 
workers, including union members (Fich-
ter 2006; �euner et al. 2007).  The obvious 
dangers cried out for new union strategies.
In spite of much cynicism within union 
ranks, the opportunities were there.  But it 
took imaginative leadership to see and build 
on existing possibilities.  The emergence of 
new strategy grounded in member engage-
ment occurred most noticeably in one region 
of Germany at a time when other regions 
faced similar circumstances.  The decisive 
element driving the change was the strategic 
reorientation of Wetzel and his colleagues in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen.  The new approaches 
spread because institutional and social 
circumstances offered similar opportunity 
elsewhere, waiting to be exploited once NRW 
24For a general perspective on lessons for European 
unions from the American labor movement, see Turner 
2007a.
25See Thelen (2001) for an argument that even in 
apparently stable coordinated market economies labor’s 
influence must be renewed in continuing processes of 
conflict and negotiation.
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leadership made a conscious decision to 
lead the way.
Case Comparisons
The Schlecker and Nordrhein-Westfalen 
cases offer examples of strategic innovation 
within a broader context of declining union 
influence and membership in Germany. 
The Schlecker campaign stands out as a rare 
victory that offers a potential model for the 
spread of worker interest representation 
(WIR) in the low-wage occupations of an 
expanding service sector.26  The ongoing 
NRW—and now national IG Metall—strategic 
reorientation demonstrates new possibilities 
to reverse decline in a union stronghold. 
The first is a case of institution building, the 
second a case of institutional revitalization. 
Innovative strategy in the Schlecker case 
took shape as “social movement unionism,” 
while IG Metall’s NRW strategy looked more 
like an “economic development unionism.”27 
The differences can be mapped out as shown 
in Figure 1.
Given the broader context of contempo-
rary industrial relations, these two cases gen-
erate the following hypotheses:  where unions 
are excluded, they must build institutions 
(starting with works councils in the German 
case), and to do so in the face of employer 
opposition they need the support of other 
social actors in a comprehensive campaign. 
By contrast, where unions retain a substantial 
insider presence, rank-and-file mobilization 
offers possibilities for institutional revitaliza-
tion.  Because most union leaders in the re-
cent past have pursued neither strategy even 
where opportunity has beckoned, it is clear 
that the choices made by unions, both local 
and national, are decisive in the pursuit of 
either institution building or revitalization.
In both cases, innovation began from the 
ground up, for the Schlecker campaign in 
Mannheim and Heidelberg, for the NRW 
case in Siegen.  And in both cases, subsequent 
regional and national union support proved 
important:  at Schlecker, support was needed 
to spread the campaign and confront the firm 
at the national level; and at IG Metall, a vital 
factor was the decision of national leadership 
to elect and support Wetzel as director for the 
pivotal NRW district.  By the same logic, the 
failure to build decisively on the Schlecker 
example for campaigns at other firms in a 
growing low-wage retail sector can be traced 
at least in part to the unwillingness of the 
national union to commit the necessary re-
sources.  By contrast, the spread of the Siegen 
model to the NRW district, and increasingly 
to other IG Metall districts, depended to 
a large extent on growing support from 
Figure 1.  Comparison of Schlecker and NRW Campaign Strategies.
Union position Expansion of WIR Focus of mobilization
Schlecker
NRW insiders workplace
outsiders institution building society
institutional revitalization
26At Schlecker and in similar campaigns elsewhere, 
the first goal is to build works councils, with union mem-
bership growth to follow.  Hence the German concept 
“worker interest representation,” referring both to works 
councils and unions.
27Because IG Metall/NRW’s firm-level bargaining 
centered on one region, the cumulative effect offered 
a potential contribution to economic restructuring, in 
what Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (2006:280–83) 
have referred to as an “old industrial region.”  I would 
suggest (and have argued elsewhere) that these two 
strategic orientations—social movement and economic 
development unionism—are overlapping but distinct 
types of an innovative “social unionism,” one that breaks 
with conventional approaches especially in a proactive 
mobilization of workers, members, and other social 
actors (Turner 2007b).
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national headquarters in Frankfurt.  In the 
face of counter-mobilization—for IG Metall 
as employers defected from sector bargain-
ing agreements and for ver.di as Schlecker 
and Lidl intensified anti-union efforts—the 
sustainability of local innovation required 
broader organizational support.28
An analysis of the two cases is consistent 
with an argument that privileges opportu-
nity—located in institutional openings and 
social context—and the strategic choices 
made by union actors.  In both cases, strate-
gies were innovative, comprehensive, and 
adapted to local circumstances in a flexible 
manner.  Choice was not a simple matter: 
strategic innovation required internal orga-
nizational debate, trial and error, and the 
proactive development of new concepts and 
tactics such as grassroots mobilization and 
coalition building.
The Literature:   
Varieties of Stability and Collapse
Literature on the German labor move-
ment, and on comparative capitalism more 
broadly, gravitates toward two poles.  The 
varieties-of-capitalism framework views 
coordinated market economies such as 
Germany as governed by a dense network 
of institutions that is relatively stable (Hall 
and Soskice 2001b:21–27).  To be sure, as 
global liberalization proceeds and competi-
tion intensifies, reforms become necessary 
and adjustments are made.  But a central 
message of the literature is that “the more 
things change the more they stay the same.” 
Institutions interact in mutually reinforcing 
ways, in patterns of coordination that change 
only slowly.  Social partnership may get rocky 
and unions may lose some influence, but 
“German employers cannot bring themselves 
to dismantle the German model” (Thelen 
1999).  Labor institutions retain an essential 
stability, even if the position of unions may 
be one of “institutional subservience” in 
a coordinated market economy (Hancké, 
Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007:22).
At the other pole stands the “hell-in-a-
handbasket” literature.  For the German 
political economy in general and the German 
labor movement in particular, the gloomy 
perspective comes from many different direc-
tions.  Economists such as Addison, Schnabel, 
and Wagner (2006) chart the long decline of 
German unions and offer only minimal hope 
for reversal.  Others see neoliberal economic 
and political forces sweeping institutions 
aside.29  Kitschelt and Streeck (2003) refer 
to “incremental disintegration” and argue 
that previously enabling institutions have 
blocked possibilities for reform across the 
broad landscape of the German political 
economy, in part due to the veto role of 
powerful interests such as labor.  Especially 
interesting is a varieties-of-capitalism break-
away literature on institutional change that 
identifies incremental deregulation that over 
time may amount to transformation (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005b).  Handbasket perspectives 
range from free market cheerleading to a 
sense of helplessness in the face of inevitable 
decline.
Evidence can be found to support all of 
the above views.  Yet all too often, the past 
gets extrapolated into the future, although 
the future is so often full of surprises (the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the global 
economic meltdown of 2008).  We all face 
great difficulty in understanding contem-
porary events as they sail by in a changing 
world economy.  The evidence presented 
here points to a German labor movement 
in decline and the weakening hold of once 
strong institutions.  Yet the case studies also 
show possibilities for institution building and 
revitalization, strategies for a renewal of union 
strength based on “best practice” successes. 
The cases show contrasting possibilities and 
outcomes in different sectors and regions of 
the economy.
Cross-national comparisons typically fo-
cus at national or sectoral levels, or in one 
arena or another of the political economy. 28Also relevant here are concepts developed by 
Behrens and Jacoby (2004):  an “experimentalist” logic 
at NRW, where power was at least somewhat balanced, 
compared to a “battlefield” logic at Schlecker and Lidl, 
where unions sought to establish influence in the face 
of powerful company opposition.
29Thus “Germany’s consensual traditions will wriggle 
for a long time before they expire.”  Economist, April 
27, 1996, p. 55.
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Also important, however, are differences 
within countries (Locke 1995; Artus 2007). 
There is, for example, a muted but growing 
debate within German unions and among 
labor academics regarding the appropriate-
ness of current U.S. union organizing and 
campaigning strategies for German unions. 
At first glance, the obvious verdict is negative 
(Waldman 2004):  the context is different, and 
the institutions make other strategies more 
viable in Germany.  I believe that assessment 
is too simplistic.  In manufacturing, where 
works councils are present and a union such 
as IG Metall has a supportive institutional 
base, the best strategy may be essentially tradi-
tional:  fostering collectively bargained wage 
policy from outside the firm; strengthening 
the bargaining position of (union-friendly) 
works councils from inside the firm.  But even 
here, where unions are strongest, strategic 
innovation appears essential, if only because 
so many firms have demanded concessions. 
And as we have seen, one of the most promis-
ing innovations parallels U.S. union efforts 
in one important way:  a renewed grassroots 
focus on member mobilization and recruit-
ment (IG Metall 2008).
Where works councils are not present and 
employers refuse to share power, a broader 
comprehensive campaign, including coali-
tion building and grassroots mobilization, 
appears essential (and in the Schlecker case 
looks very much like the strategies of unions 
such as SEIU and Unite Here in the United 
States).  In private sector services, and es-
pecially for low-wage occupations, radical 
innovations in strategy may be necessary, 
given intense employer opposition.  But such 
innovation can also be blocked by the domi-
nance of traditional union strategy, even as 
that strategy becomes less and less successful.
The interaction between institutions 
and activism is itself an important area for 
research that can be informed by compara-
tive analysis, across firms, regions, sectors, 
and nations.  The problem is that literature 
focused on institutions (for example, Hall 
and Soskice 2001a) and a separate body of 
work oriented toward activism, including con-
tentious politics and social movements (for 
example, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1999), 
do not speak to each other enough.30  Yet the 
revitalization of labor institutions, as we have 
seen, may well require periodic grassroots 
mobilization, especially when hell arrives 
in a handbasket.  This is true both where 
institutions are strong, as in the NRW case, 
and where they are not, as at Schlecker and 
Lidl.  Mobilization efforts, whether led from 
the top or arising from the grassroots (before 
combining in a comprehensive strategy, as 
they must do for success; Milkman 2006), 
may aim not only to revitalize institutions 
but to build them as well.
Peter Katzenstein’s influential “incre-
mentalist” perspective on German politics 
is pitched at the level of the state and sus-
taining policy networks (Katzenstein 1987, 
2005).  For unions, the relative stability of 
the industrial relations system permits only 
incremental change, for gains, losses, and 
policy influence, and this is true in spite 
of the substantial reforms of recent years. 
The NRW case fits this analysis:  substantial 
yet still incremental innovation within the 
established institutional context, with a new 
focus on member recruitment and engage-
ment as a means of shoring up union influ-
ence at the workplace and in the broader 
political economy.  The Schlecker and Lidl 
cases, by contrast, illustrate how much of the 
German labor market—and society—stand 
for all practical purposes outside the existing 
institutional framework.  Restructuring in 
privatized industries such as telecommunica-
tions, postal services, and rail transportation 
has also contributed to growing non-union 
segments of the economy.  For worker inter-
est representation, radical innovation makes 
sense where incrementalism offers little 
hope.  Such innovations in union strategy, 
however, as Katzenstein might predict, are 
more than likely to be blocked by institutions 
and actors long schooled in strategies aimed 
at incremental gains.
Institutions can facilitate or block innova-
tion, depending in part on how actors choose 
30According to the contentious politics literature, 
key factors driving the emergence of social movements 
include resource mobilization, opportunity structure, 
and framing (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1999), ele-
ments of a rich analysis largely consistent with the cases 
presented here.
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to use the institutions.  Just as employers 
can seize opportunities to weaken unions in 
market-oriented economic and political con-
texts, so too can unions seize opportunities 
present in institutional and social contexts 
for purposes of their own.  Policy experts 
worry that entrenched unions continue to 
block much-needed reforms aimed at chronic 
unemployment, labor market rigidities, and 
economic stagnation—with the implication 
that unions must to some extent be pushed 
out of the way (Streeck 2005).  As unions 
are weakened, however, by aggressive em-
ployer strategies, government policy, and 
an economic restructuring that favors the 
spread of service sector jobs, many of them 
low-wage and lacking any form of worker 
interest representation, labor becomes even 
more defensive in the face of policy reform. 
Because labor protections remain present 
even as union membership declines, “hell-
in-a-handbasket” analysis emphasizing union 
blockage implies little hope for real policy 
reform—especially but not only in a context 
of export-led economic growth and centrist 
governance.
Yet there is no necessary reason why re-
surgent unions, both in manufacturing bases 
and in service occupations where unions have 
been excluded, cannot gain the renewed 
confidence and power necessary to negoti-
ate policy reform that is both politically and 
economically viable (Hoffmann 2006).  Con-
temporary debate is dominated by a zero-sum 
perspective.  On the one hand, the argument 
goes, economic and social policy reform is 
blocked by powerful interest groups such as 
labor and thus faces political stalemate.  On 
the other hand, politically viable strategies are 
incompatible with successful economic and 
social policy reform.  Breaking the stalemate 
requires either defeating the unions or bring-
ing them aboard to help shape processes of 
reform.  Much will depend on union strategy 
(Visser 2007:115).
For unions, opportunities for alternative 
choices are there.  Unions can defend their 
shrinking bases, weakened yet still capable 
of fighting successfully against reform, or 
they can innovate.  The NRW case suggests 
a potential for strategic reform based on 
member engagement and recruitment.  The 
Schlecker/Lidl cases offer an alternative cam-
paigning approach based on social coalition 
building and rank-and-file activism, yet so far 
limited by both militant employer opposition 
and a corresponding lack of union resource 
commitment.  The unifying feature of both 
innovations is grassroots mobilization.
Arguments that emphasize stability or col-
lapse each fail to see the potential for strategic 
innovation and a corresponding willingness 
of workers and their allies to participate 
actively in the politics of the workplace. 
Arguments that emphasize institutions as 
primarily either facilitators or suppressors 
of worker interests also typically ignore the 
potential for—and positive effects of—ex-
panded participation (Turner 1996).  The 
dialectic between institutions and activism is 
more interesting, and in the long run more 
important, than one-dimensional analyses 
of economic and social policy reform, social 
movement mobilization, or organizational 
behavior in established institutional contexts.
An emphasis on unpredictable actor 
choice is troubling to social scientists, and 
not only to theorists of rational choice.  Yet 
a universe of social interaction is complex 
and messy, defying determinist explana-
tion.  Given particular institutions, social 
context, politics, economic circumstances, 
culture, identities, and other factors, we can 
examine causal processes and predict what 
is likely.  No matter how sharp the analysis, 
however, organizations and individuals can 
and do often surprise us with the choices 
they make.
Future of the German Labor Movement
For much of the postwar period, German 
unions made good choices:  for institution 
building in the early years, institutional 
revitalization in the 1970s, and institutional 
stability in the 1980s.  The unexpected col-
lapse of the East German regime threw many 
things up for grabs.  Western unions moved 
quickly into eastern Germany along with 
western labor institutions, transplanted on 
new terrain in contentious circumstances 
and with shallow roots (Turner 1998).  Much 
conventional analysis blames unions for dis-
couraging investment by pushing wages in the 
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east up toward western standards.  Unions, 
however, did what was politically necessary 
in response to the demands of eastern mem-
bers, with broad agreement from employer 
associations.
In part as a result of prolonged economic 
crisis in the east but due also to broader 
economic and political processes of Euro-
peanization and global liberalization, insti-
tutions have wobbled in the face of intense 
challenges.  In a context of institutional 
instability, German unions over the past 
decade have not adapted well to changing 
circumstances.  Unions have been slow to 
move beyond their bases in manufacturing 
and the public sector.  Strategic innovation 
has been all too infrequent.  Unions have 
by and large reacted defensively in the face 
of employer demands, membership decline, 
and economic and social policy reforms.
In the United States, from the 1970s well 
into the 1990s, union leaders pretended that 
New Deal institutions were intact, denied 
the crisis of the American labor movement, 
continued to export a failed industrial rela-
tions model, reacted defensively to employer 
and government attacks, and finally grappled 
with existential despair (Fantasia and Voss 
2004).  German unions can learn from the 
negative American experience while they 
still have an institutional base on which to 
build (Waldman 2004).  They can also draw 
on American labor’s crisis-driven innovations 
such as grassroots mobilization and coalition 
building, adapted to a German institutional 
context (Raffo 2007; Schreider 2007a; IGM 
2008).
While much of the literature on German 
labor remains rooted in a perspective based 
in manufacturing, employment in service 
industries exceeds that in manufacturing and 
continues to grow as a percentage of the total 
work force.  Private sector services include a 
growing union-free zone (Jacobi 2003; Royle 
2004; Artus 2007).  In part, the future of the 
German labor movement rests on an ability 
to bring worker interest representation to 
growing low-wage occupational categories 
in industries such as building services, retail 
sales, and food service.  The Schlecker case 
offers an innovative model for institution 
building in campaigns based on grassroots 
mobilization, coalition building, and public 
demands for social justice.  This kind of 
strategy is now on the table, pursued by ver.
di activists in a recent campaign at Lidl, yet 
still awaiting a substantial union commitment 
of resources and support.
Even in traditional manufacturing 
strongholds, where union roots are deep, 
the ground has been slipping away as em-
ployers demand concessions and renege on 
bargaining agreements.  If unions cannot 
hold on where they are strongest, there is 
little hope elsewhere.  Perhaps just in time, 
a new strategic orientation has emerged, 
most prominently (although not only) in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, the largest IG Metall 
district.  Organized around member mobili-
zation, the new approach offers unexpected 
promise for institutional revitalization.
Practitioners—and academic observers—
fail when they cannot break with traditional 
perspectives, see only stability or collapse, 
or become trapped in unreal expectations, 
denial, or despair.  Today unions are reeling, 
in many cases reduced to a defense of existing 
protections and policies, even in countries 
such as Germany where labor institutions 
remain embedded in much of the political 
economy.  Yet opportunity awaits, in changing 
institutional configurations and turbulent so-
cial contexts.  Unions for the most part have 
failed to break with tradition, to innovate, to 
take advantage of opportunity.  They are not 
obliged to continue to fail.
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